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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Estate of Jack King and Bonnie King (collectively the "Kings") hereby adopt
the statement of jurisdiction set forth in Dee Henshaw's Opening Brief. (Br. at vi.)1
However, as set forth herein, the Kings contend that this Court does not have jurisdiction
to entertain Henshaw's appeal of the trial court's grant of directed verdict where Henshaw
did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days of the entry of the directed verdict.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain Henshaw's appeal of the trial

court's May 15, 2006, Order on Motions for Directed Verdict where Henshaw did not file
a notice of appeal of the Order until December 15, 2006.
If an appeal is not timely filed, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth.. 2000 UT App 299, f 7, 13 P.3d 616.
2.

Assuming this Court has jurisdiction to consider Henshaw's appeal of the

directed verdict, did the trial court err in granting the Kings' Motions for Directed Verdict
where Henshaw failed to present any evidence at trial, in his opening brief, or in the
record on appeal, that he acquired Raymond Watrous' Pine Creek water rights for
purposes of establishing his quiet title action?

1

Citation conventions in this brief are as follows: "Br." refers to Henshaw's
Opening Brief, "Add. Exh." refers to an exhibit in the Kings' Addendum, and "R." refers
to the record on appeal.
1

In reviewing a trial court's order granting a motion for directed verdict, this Court
uses the same standard as the trial court, evaluating whether the evidence at trial raised a
question of material fact which precluded judgment as a matter of law. Martinez v.
Wells. 2004 UT App 4 3 , ^ 12, 88 P.3d 343.
3.

Whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion when it denied

Henshaw's Rule 60(b) motion where the court's entry of the Order on Motions for
Directed Verdict did not violate Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2) and where Henshaw failed to
produce any evidence that he diligently tried to determine whether a judgment had been
entered against him or that the Kings' counsel had actual knowledge that a judgment had
been entered and intentionally withheld that information from him.
A trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate a judgment is ordinarily
reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Franklin Covey Client Sales. Inc. v. Melvin.
2000 UT App 110, U 8, 2 P.3d 451. This issue was preserved in the tri^l court by

I
Henshaw in his Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 60(b) URCP. (R. at 1175-1176.)
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of
appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)
(b) Time for appeal extended by certain motions.

2

(b)(1) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following motions, the time
for all parties to appeal from the judgment runs from entry of the order disposing of the
motion:
(b)(1)(A) a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure;
(b)(1)(B) a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an
alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted under Rule 52(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(b)(1)(C) a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure;
(b)(1)(D) a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure; or
(b)(1)(E) a motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(e)
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable
neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed
not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b)
of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte
unless the trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the
prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice
of the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days
from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(e)(2)
(e)(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challengedfinding or
conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is
unsupported or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a
transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the
appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions
of the transcript.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(f)(2)
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within
fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in
conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed
within five days after service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order
upon being served with an objection or upon expiration of the time to object.
3

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 58A(d)
(d) Notice of singing or entry of judgment A copy of the signed judgment shall be
promptly served by the party preparing it in the matter provided in Rule 5. The time for
filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the requirement of this provision.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case.
This case has infested the court system for nearly seven years and involves a

dispute between the Kings and Henshaw over the use and ownership of water. For more
than thirty years, the Kings have enjoyed the right to use water from Pine Creek for
thirteen days and three hours during an eighteen day schedule. The Kings conveyed a
water deed to their previous neighbors, Raymond and Mildred Watrous, which provided
that the Watrouses were entitled to use three hours of the Kings' water every eighteen
days. The Kings and Watrouses enjoyed an amicable relationship and no disputes ever
arose regarding use of the water. However, when Henshaw moved onto the Watrous'
property he began using the Kings' water for more than his allocated three hours. The
parties disputed Henshaw's use and right to the water and Henshaw filed this action in
July of 2000 to quiet title to his alleged water rights.
II.

Course of Proceedings,
Henshaw's case against the Kings was heard before a jury on April 17-20, 2006.

At the close of Henshaw' evidence, the Kings moved for a directed verdict dismissing all
of Henshaw's claims. The court granted the Kings' motion from the bench, and among

4

other rulings, concluded that the evidence failed to show that Henshaw acquired any
right, title, and/or interest of Raymond Watrous to Pine Creek water or any easement on
the Kings' land.
On May 15, 2006, the trial court entered an Order and Judgment on Motions for
Directed Verdict which memorialized its rulingfromthe bench. That same day, Henshaw
sent an objection to the proposed Order on Motions for Directed Verdict to the trial court.
On June 19,2006, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order in
which the court rejected Henshaw's objections to the Proposed Order and Judgment and
ruled that both the Proposed Order and Judgment embodied the court's rulingfromthe
bench.
On June 23, 2006, thirty-nine days after the court entered its May 15, 2006 Order
and Judgment, Henshaw filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the court's directed
verdict which the trial court ultimately denied as untimely.
Henshaw then filed a Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 60(b) which sought to
vacate the trial court's Order granting directed verdict.
III.

Disposition in the Court Below.
On November 14, 2006, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order

on Henshaw's Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 60(b) wherein the court denied
Henshaw's motion. The court ruled that its Order and Judgment did not violate Rule
7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure where that rule is binding only upon counsel

5

and not the trial court. The court also rejected Henshaw's request to vacate the directed
verdict on the grounds that the Kings' counsel had violated Rule 58A(d) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure where Henshaw had failed to produce any evidence to
demonstrate that he had been diligent in trying to determine whether the judgment had
been entered. Moreover, the court ruled that Henshaw failed to produce any evidence that
the Kings' counsel had actual knowledge that the Order and Judgment had been entered
on May 15, 2006, and that he intentionally withheld that information from Henshaw.
Henshaw then filed his notice of appeal on December 15, 2006.
IV.

Statement of Facts
As a preliminary matter, the Kings object to Henshaw's Statement of Facts to the

extent that it cites unsupported factual allegations set forth in documents such as
Henshaw's Complaint (R. at 1-16), Amended Complaint (R. at 467-481), Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 738-775), and Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. at 780-821) as fact. The Kings
contend that any reference to facts related to the Pine Creek water rights should be based
on evidence that was properly offered and received at trial. However, where Henshaw
has not provided this Court with a copy of the trial transcript for the record, no facts
related to the evidence presented at trial may be properly cited on appeal. See Accord
Bevan v. J.H. Constr. Co.. 669 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1983)(holding that in the absence of a

6

transcript, the appellate court presumes the trial proceedings were proper and judgment
was supported by the evidence).
A.

Kings' Motion for Directed Verdict

1.

This case was heard before a jury on April 17-20, 2006 in the Sixth District

Court in and for Wayne County, State of Utah. (R. at 1068; Add. Exh.2 at pg.l.)
2.

At the close of Henshaw's case, the Kings moved the court for a directed

verdict dismissing all of Henshaw9s claims and granting the Kings' counterclaim to quiet
title to Pine Creek water. (R. at 1068; Add. Exh. 2 at p.l.)
3.

The court ruled on the Kings' motion for directed verdict from the bench,

granting it in part and denying it in part. (R. at 1068; Add. Exh. 2 at pg.l.)
4.

In its directed verdict, the court found that:

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and resolving
all controverted facts in their favor, the evidence failed to show that plaintiffs
acquired any right, title and/or interest of Raymond Watrous to Pine Creek water
or any right, title and/or interest of Raymond Watrous to any easement on the land
of the defendants and the court directs a verdict adjudging that plaintiffs acquired
no right, title or interest of Raymond Watrous to Pine Creek water or to an
easement.
(R. at 1069-1070; Add. Exh. 2 4 5 at pgs. 2-3 .)2
5.

The Jury issued a verdict on April 20, 2006, which mirrored the court's

directed verdict. The Verdict stated that Henshaw had failed to establish that he was

2

As part of the trial court's direct verdict, the court dismissed all claims asserted
by plaintiffs Barbara Henshaw and Dana Henshaw. Accordingly, Dee Henshaw is the
only remaining plaintiff and appellant in this appeal.
7

entitled to use water from Pine Creek or that he had an easement on the Kings' property.
(R. at 1011-1012; Add. Exh. 1 atffl[ 1,3.)3
6.

Following the trial, the court directed the Kings' counsel to draft a proposed

Judgment and Order on the Motions for Directed Verdict which conformed to the court's
directed verdict and the jury verdict. Pursuant to this directive, the Kings' counsel
prepared and served the proposed Judgment and Order on Henshaw's counsel on May 4,
2006. (R. at 1128; Add. Exh. 4 at pg. 4.)
7.

Upon the expiration often days from the date the proposed Judgment and

Order were submitted to Henshaw's counsel, the trial court's clerk presented the proposed
Judgment and Order to the court for signature. Having received no objection to the
drafts, the court executed the Order and Judgment on May 15, 2006. (R. at 1128; Add.
Exh. 4 at pg. 4; R. at 1073-1074; Add. Exh. 3 at pg. 2.)
8.

On May 18, 2006, the trial court received Henshaw's Objection to the

Proposed Judgment and Order. The Objection was signed by Henshaw's counsel on May
15, 2006. (R. at 1128; Add. Exh. 4 at pg. 4.)

3

In Henshaw's Opening Brief, he consistently states as fact that "the jury found
that [the] Kings had in fact sold water rights to the Watrouses and that those rights were
transferred to Mr. Henshaw by the Warranty Deeds from Mildred Watrous to Barbara
Henshaw and from Barbara Henshaw to Dee Henshaw . . . " (Br. at 3, 8 at ^| 24.)
Henshaw cites the jury verdict in support of this contention. However, the Verdict
contains no such conclusion and, in fact, expressly contradicts this contention. As set
forth in the Verdict, the jury found that Henshaw had failed to establish that he was
entitled to use water from Pine Creek. (R. at 1011-1012; Add. Exh. 1 atfflf1,3.)
8

9.

Upon receiving Henshaw's Objection, and unaware that the Court had

entered their Proposed Order and Judgment, the Kings filed a Reply Memorandum in
Support of Proposed Judgment and Proposed Order on Motion for Directed Verdict on
May 22, 2006. (R. at 1091-1099.)
B.

May 15,2006 Order On Motions for Directed Verdict

10.

On May 15, 2006, the trial court entered an Order on Motions for Directed

Verdict (the "Order"). (R. at 1125-1130; Add. Exh. 4.)
11.

The court's Order conformed to the court's grant of directed verdict in

favor of the Kings and ruled that the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to
Henshaw, failed to show that Henshaw acquired Raymond Watrous' Pine Creek water
rights or an easement on the Kings' land. (R. at 1069-1070; Add. Exh. 2 at pgs.2-3.)
C.

June 19, 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order on Henshaw's
Objection to Proposed Judgment and Proposed Order

12.

On June 19, 2006, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision and

Order in which it denied Henshaw's May 15, 2006 Objection to the Kings' proposed
Order and Judgment. (R. at 1125-1130; Add. Exh. 4.)
13.

The court's Order noted that it had received Henshaw's Objection on May

18, 2006, three days after it had entered the Proposed Order and Judgment, and that it
therefore considered the Objection to be untimely. (R. at 1128; Add. Exh. 4 at pg. 4.)
14.

However, the court also stated that notwithstanding Henshaw's Objection,

the Kings' Proposed Order and Judgment accurately reflected the court's ruling on the
9

Motions for Directed Verdict as well as the Verdict rendered by the jury and the court
therefore overruled Henshaw9s objection to the Proposed Order and Judgment. (R. at
1128;Add.Exh.4atpg.4.)
D.

Henshaw's Rule 59(e) Motion

15.

On June 23, 2006, thirty-nine days after the court entered its Order on

Motions for Directed Verdict and Judgment, Henshaw filed a Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter
or Amend the Court's Directed Verdict. (R. at 1131-1143.)
16.

The gravamen of Henshaw's Rule 59(e) motion was his new argument that

the trial court erred in entering the Order and Judgment because the Kings lacked
standing to challenge whether Henshaw had presented evidence that he acquired water
rights from Raymond Watrous. Henshaw's motion also asserted that the trial court erred
where Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(f)(2) provides that objections to a proposed order
shall be filed within five days after service, and therefore the trial court was not "legally
entitled to execute the Order" until May 16, 2006. (R. at 1131-1138.)
17.

The Kings filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Henshaw's Rule 59(e)

motion wherein the Kings contended, among other arguments, that the court should deny
the Henshaw's motion where it was not served within ten days after the entry of the
court's Order on Motions for Directed Verdict as mandated by Rule 59(e). (R. at 11441145.)
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18.

On September 13, 2006, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision and

Order on Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment in which the court denied Henshaw's Rule
59(e) motion on the grounds that it was untimely. (R. at 1171-1174; Add. Exh. 5 at pgs.
1-2.)
E.

Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion

19.

On September 23, 2006, Henshaw filed a Motion for Relief Pursuant to

Rule 60(b) wherein he repeated his contention that the trial court erred in entering the
Order on Motions for Directed Verdict and Judgment based on Rule 7(f)(2) and that
entering the Order and Judgment prior to receiving his Objection violated his due process
and equal protection rights. Henshaw also repeated his argument that the Order and
Judgment should be vacated where the Kings' counsel did not inform Henshaw that the
Proposed Order had been signed and entered in accordance with Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 58A(d). (R. at 1175-1188).
20.

On October 3, 2006, the Kings filed a Memorandum in Opposition to

Henshaw's Rule 60(b) motion. In their Memorandum, the Kings contended that Henshaw
had been afforded due process and equal protection where he had been given numerous
opportunities to be heard and present the arguments he was now rearguing. The Kings
also asserted that Rule 7(f)(2) is only binding on counsel and not the court. Moreover, the
Kings asserted that to be entitled to relief under Rule 60(b), a litigant must make

11

reasonably diligent efforts to learn of the entry ofjudgment and that Henshaw had failed
to produce any evidence that he had exercised such diligence. (R. at 1191-1200.)
21.

On November 14, 2006, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision and

Order on Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion which denied the Motion. (R. at 1209-1214;
Add. Exh. 6 at pgs. 1-5.)
22.

The court concluded that Rule 7(f)(2) is binding only upon counsel and

therefore the court was not required to wait five days after service of Henshaw's
Objection to enter the proposed Order and Judgment. (R. at 1210-1211; Add. Exh. 6 at
pgs. 2-3.)
23.

The court also rejected Henshaw's claim that its entry of the Order and

Judgment violated Rule 58A(d) and held that to be entitled to relief under Rule 60(b),
Henshaw was required to produce evidence demonstrating his diligent attempts to
determine whether the judgment had been entered. The court found that Henshaw failed
to produce any such evidence. The court also found that Henshaw failed to produce any
evidence that the Kings' counsel had actual knowledge of the judgment and intentionally
failed to notify Henshaw about it. (R. at 1211-1213; Add. Exh. 6 at pgs. 3-5.)
F.

Henshaw's Appeal

24.

On December 15, 2006, Henshaw filed a Notice of Appeal in which he

appealed the trial court's Order on Motions for Directed Verdict entered on May 15,

12

2006, as well as the trial court's denial of his Rule 60(b) Motion entered on November 15,
2006. (R. at 1215-1216.)
25.

On January 18, 2007, Henshaw filed a Statement Regarding Transcript

wherein he stated that no transcript of any hearing was necessary for purposes of this
appeal. (R. at 1219-1220.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the trial court's Order on Motions for Directed Verdict as
well as its Order Denying Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion. With respect to Henshaw's
appeal of the directed verdict, the Kings contend that this Court does not have jurisdiction
to consider this appeal where Henshaw filed his notice of appeal seven months after the
entry of the directed verdict he now appeals from. Additionally, Henshaw's failure to file
a timely Rule 59(e) motion or a motion for extension of time to appeal pursuant to Utah
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(e) renders his December 15, 2006, notice of appeal
untimely, and therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Henshaw's appeal of the
directed verdict.
However, even if this Court has jurisdiction to consider Henshaw's appeal of the
directed verdict, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed where Henshaw failed to
produce any evidence at trial, in his appellate brief, or in the record itself to contradict or
call into question the court's finding that Henshaw did not acquire Raymond Watrous'
Pine Creek water rights.

13

A trial court may grant a directed verdict if the evidence presented at trial, viewed
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, establishes that there is no question
of material fact which would preclude judgment as a matter of law. In this case, Henshaw
failed to produce any evidence that he had acquired Raymond Watrous' Pine Creek water
rights in support of his quiet title action. Accordingly, where Henshaw failed to produce
any evidence to support his claim, the trial court correctly entered a directed verdict in the
Kings' favor.
Furthermore, this Court should affirm the directed verdict where Henshaw has
failed to satisfy his marshaling requirement on appeal. When an appellant challenges a
trial court's directed verdict, the appellant is obligated to first marshal the evidence in
support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed
in the light most favorable to the verdict. Pursuant to this standard, Rule 11(e)(2) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that if an appellant "intends to urge on
appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or
conclusion."
In his appeal, Henshaw urges this Court to reverse the trial court on the grounds
that the directed verdict was unsupported or contrary to the evidence. However, Henshaw
has neither marshaled the evidence for this Court's benefit nor provided a transcript of the
trial pursuant to Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Therefore, this

14

Court does hot have a complete record from which to review the evidence presented at
trial, and the trial court's finding that Henshaw did not acquire Raymond Watrous' Pine
Creek water rights should be affirmed.
This Court should also affirm the trial court's Order Denying Henshaw's Rule
60(b) Motion. The trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion by denying
Henshaw's motion where its entry of the Order Granting Motions for Directed Verdict
did not violate Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, where
Henshaw failed to present any evidence that he had been reasonably diligent in an attempt
to determine if a judgment had been entered, the trial court correctly entered the proposed
Order and Judgment. Moreover, the trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion in
denying Henshaw's motion where he failed to present any evidence that the Kings'
counsel had actual knowledge that the judgment had been entered and intentionally
withheld that information from Henshaw.
Finally, the Kings contend that they should be awarded their attorney fees incurred
in defending against Henshaw's frivolous appeal pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
ARGUMENT
I.

This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Consider Henshaw's Appeal Of The Order
On Motions For Directed Verdict Where The Notice Of Appeal Was Untimely
This Court does not have jurisdiction to consider Henshaw's appeal of the Order

on Motions for Directed Verdict. The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure make clear that
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a notice of appeal must be filed "within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or
order appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 4(a). This Court has held that "[i]f an appeal is
not timely filed, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal." Serrate v. Utah Transit
AutL, 2000 UT App 299, ^ 7, 13 P.3d 616. See also Prowswood. Inc. v. Mountain Fuel
Supply Co.. 676 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 1984)(stating that "it is axiomatic in this jurisdiction
that failure to timely perfect an appeal is a jurisdictional failure requiring dismissal of the
appeal.") Accordingly, a notice of appeal filed more than thirty days after the entry of the
judgment or order appealed from is untimely and an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to
hear such an appeal.
However, certain post-judgment motions, including a motion to alter or amend the
judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure extend the time for appeal.
Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(C). Rule 4 provides that if any party timely files a motion to alter
or amend the judgment, "the time for all parties to appeal from the judgment runs from
the entry of the order disposing of the motion . . . . " Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(1). However,
the motion to alter or amend must be timely and served "not later than 10 days after entry
of the judgment." UtahR. Civ. P. 59(e).
In this case, the trial court entered both the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict
and Judgment on May 15, 2006. (R. at 1068-1072,1073-1074; Add. Exh. 2, Add. Exh. 3.)
Pursuant to Rule 4(a), Henshaw was therefore required to file his notice of appeal within
30 days of May 15, 2006. While Henshaw did file a Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or
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Amend on June 27, 2006, it was not filed within 10 days of the May 15, 2006, Order and
Judgment, and was therefore untimely and had no effect on Rule 4(a)'s thirty day notice
of appeal requirement.
After filing a Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief, and having that motion denied,
Henshaw filed his notice of appeal on December 15, 2006 - exactly seven months after
the trial court entered the Order and Judgment Henshaw now appeals. The Kings contend
that Henshaw's notice of appeal was untimely where neither his Rule 59(e) Motion nor
his Rule 60(b) Motion extended the time for filing his notice of appeal.4
The Kings recognize Henshaw's contention that he did not have actual knowledge
of the trial court's entry of the Order and Judgment until June 19, 2006, when the court
issued a Memorandum Decision and Order on Henshaw's Objection to the Order. (Br. at
pg. 9,fflf31-32.) However, even if Henshaw did not learn of the entry of the Order until
after the time for filing his notice of appeal under Rule 4(a) had expired, Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(e) still provided a mechanism for Henshaw to file a timely notice
of appeal.

4

A motion for relief from judgment or order under Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure is not recognized as a post-judgment motion which extends the time for
appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b); Gillett v. Price. 2006 UT 24, K 7, 135 P.2d 861
(holding that postjudgment motions to reconsider will not toll the time for appeal).
Therefore, Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion had no effect on the deadline to file his notice
of appeal.
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Rule 4(e) provides that "[t]he trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or
good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later
than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
rule." Utah R. App. P. 4(e). Accordingly, had Henshaw asked the trial court for an
extension of time to file his notice of appeal and explained that he did not know the Order
and Judgment had been entered in time to appeal within 30 days of their entry, this
explanation would likely be considered "good cause" for purposes of granting a Rule 4(e)
extension, and Henshaw could have filed a timely notice of appeal of the May 15, 2006,
Order and Judgment. Henshaw failed to do so.
In this case, Henshaw failed to file a timely Rule 4(a) notice of appeal, a timely
Rule 59(e) motion, or a Rule 4(e) motion for extension to appeal. Accordingly,
Henshaw's notice of appeal filed seven months after the Order was entered is untimely
and this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider his appeal.
II.

Even If This Court Has Jurisdiction To Consider Henshaw's Appeal. The
Trial Court's Order On Motions For Directed Verdict Should Be Affirmed
The trial court's Order on Motions for Directed Verdict should be affirmed where

Henshaw failed to provide any evidence at trial or on appeal which would preclude the
trial court's directed verdict. Consequently, Henshaw has failed to provide a complete
record from which this Court can review the evidence relevant to the issue raised on
appeal.
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A.

The trial court's directed verdict was appropriate where Henshaw
failed to provide any evidence at trial to support his prima facie case

Henshaw failed to produce any evidence at trial which would preclude the court's
directed verdict against him. Motions for directed verdict are often made against a party
asserting a cause of action, and when entered against a plaintiff, "amount to a
determination that the plaintiff has failed to meet the burden of coming forward with
sufficient evidence to sustain a jury verdict. DeBry v. Cascade Enterprises, 879 P.2d
1353, 1359 (Utah 1994)(dtmg Charles A. Miller & Arthur R. Miller, 9 Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2535 (1971)). Accordingly, a trial court may only grant a directed
verdict if the moving party demonstrates that no evidence exists that raises a question of
material fact. Smith v. Fairfax Realty. Inc.. 2003 UT 41, «J 12, 82 P.3d 1064.
In this case, the trial court granted the Kings' motion for directed verdict and
found that:
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and resolving
all controverted facts in their favor, the evidence failed to show that plaintiffs
acquired any right, title and/or interest of Raymond Watrous to any easement on
the land of the defendants and the court directs a verdict that plaintiffs acquired no
right, title or interest of Raymond Watrous to Pine Creek water or to an easement.
(R. at 1069-1070; Add. Exh. 2. at pgs. 2-3.) The Kings contend that this finding was not
only correct, but also the only possible conclusion the jury could reach where Henshaw
did not present any evidence to the court to consider for purposes of refuting the directed
verdict.
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Henshaw's case was essentially an action to quiet title to water rights, and as such,
Henshaw had the burden of proving at trial that he held title to the disputed rights. (R. at
1070; Add. Exh. 2 at pg.3, ^ 6.) The Utah Supreme Court has characterized this burden
as follows, "in an action to quiet title to water rights, a plaintiff must succeed on the
strength of his own title, not on the weakness of defendant's." Church v. Meadow
Springs Ranch Corp. Inc.. 659 P.2d 1045, 1048-1049 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted).
Therefore, in order to prevail on his claim, Henshaw had to establish his own claim to
title, and in order to do this, he had to prove that he acquired Raymond Watrous9 water
rights. Henshaw could only prove his title if he provided evidence that Raymond
Watrous transferred his interest in the Pine Creek water to Mildred Watrous or Barbara
Henshaw by conveyance or operation of law. Henshaw provided evidence of neither.
A water right can be conveyed by deed. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-10(1 )(a).
However, Henshaw did not produce any evidence of a deed from Raymond to Mildred
Watrous or to Barbara or Dee Henshaw. Therefore, Henshaw presented no evidence that
Raymond Watrous conveyed his water rights interest by deed.
In the absence of a conveyance, it is possible to acquire water rights by operation
of law, such as by right of survivorship or by inheritance. However, Henshaw provided
no evidence to show that Raymond and Mildred Watrous held the Pine Creek water rights
as joint tenants with the survivor of the co-tenants to retain the entire interest. See Utah
Code Ann. § 57-l-5(l)(b); § 75-3-101; Thomas and Backman, Utah Real Property Law, §
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2.03(a)(3). Accordingly, the interests of Raymond and Mildred Watrous do not qualify
for joint tenancy because there is no express declaration ofjoint tenancy or right of
survivorship.
To prove that Henshaw acquired Raymond Watrous' interest by devisee or
inheritance, Henshaw had to establish that Raymond Watrous devised his interest to
Mildred in a probated will or that Mildred acquired Raymond's interest as part of
Raymond's intestate estate. To prove either survivorship, devise or inheritance, Henshaw
had to first prove that Raymond died, thereby conveying his interest to Mildred.
However, at trial Henshaw produced no evidence of joint tenancy, no evidence of
a conveyance from Raymond to Mildred, no evidence of Raymond's probated will or
evidence of an intestate estate of Raymond Watrous. Furthermore, Henshaw failed to
produce evidence that Raymond and/or Mildred Watrous had died, the dates of their
respective deaths, or their relationship to each other at the time of death. All of these
facts were necessary to prove that Mildred acquired the rights of Raymond and thus could
convey those rights to Barbara Henshaw who then conveyed them to Henshaw. However,
where Henshaw failed to provide any of the aforementioned evidence the trial court was
correct in granting directed verdict against him.
An entry of directed verdict against a plaintiffs claim amounts to a trial court's
determination that the plaintiff has failed to meet the burden of coming forward with
sufficient evidence to sustain a jury verdict. DeBry, 879 P.2d at 1359. In this case, the

21

directed verdict was proper where Henshaw provided no evidence at trial sufficient to
sustain a jury verdict in his favor or to call into question the trial court's directed verdict.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in entering an Order granting the Kings9 Motion
for Directed Verdict.
Henshaw dedicates a substantial portion of his Opening Brief to his contention that
the Kings lacked standing to challenge Henshaw9 s acquisition of Raymond Watrous' Pine
Creek water rights. (Br. at 11-17.) The Kings contend that Henshaw's standing argument
is inapposite to this case and should therefore be disregarded for the following reasons.
First, the Kings are the defendants in this proceedings and not the plaintiffs. The
numerous cases cited by Henshaw in support of his argument all provide that standing
requires that "a plaintiff show some distinct and palpable injury.5 However, the Kings
are not the plaintiffs in this case and have not alleged any injury in fact. Accordingly, the
standing inquiry does not apply to them and Henshaw's standing argument should be
disregarded.
Second, the Kings' Motion for Directed Verdict was not a claim based on the
assertion of Raymond Watrous' rights, but rather a challenge to whether Henshaw had
met "the burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence to sustain a jury verdict."

5

See Sierra Club v. Dept. of Env't. Quality. Div. of Solid & Hazardous Waste. 857
P.2d 982, 986 (Utah 1993)(rev'd on other grounds); Luian v. Defenders of Wildlife. 504
U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Washington Citv Water Conservancy v. Morsaa 2003 UT 58, % 17,
82 P.3d 1125; Council of Holladav Citv v. Mavor Dennis Larkia 2004 UT 24, % 27, 89
P.3d 164; Havmond v. Bonneville Billing & Collections. 2004 UT 27, f 6, 89 P.3d 171.
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See DeBry, 879 P.2d at 1359. The Kings contend that they were fully entitled to
challenge the sufficiency of Henshaw's case as part of their defense, and that no standing
inquiry was required.
In summary, the trial court's directed verdict and finding that Henshaw did not
acquire Raymond Watrous' Pine Creek water interest was correct where Henshaw
provided no evidence at trial to contradict or even call into question this finding.
Moreover, Henshaw's contention that the trial court erred in entering the Order by virtue
of the Kings' alleged lack of standing is irrelevant and should be disregarded. This Court
should therefore affirm the trial court's Order granting Directed Verdicts.
B.

This Court should affirm the trial court's directed verdict where
Henshaw has failed to provide this Court with a complete record on
appeal

Henshaw's contention that the trial court erred in granting the Kings' directed
verdict is an unsupported, unilateral allegation which this Court cannot resolve. When an
appellant challenges a trial court's ruling on a directed verdict, "the appellant is obligated
to first 'marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the
evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" Neely v.
Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, f 11, 51 P.3d 724. To facilitate this marshaling requirement,
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that "[i]f the appellant
intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to
the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant
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to such finding or conclusion." Utah R. App. P. 4(e). This Court has held that when an
appellant fails to provide it with a transcript of the proceedings, it is unable to review the
evidence and, therefore, "[it] can only presume that the judgment was supported by
sufficient evidence." Horton v. Gem State Mut. of Utah, 749 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990)(citation omitted).
In Horton. the trial court found that the appellant had breached the terms of an
insurance contract. Id. at 848. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's findings
and noted that the appellant had the burden of not only providing this Court with an
adequate record to preserve its arguments for review but also to marshal all of the
evidence that supported the trial court's findings. Id. at 849. This Court stated that
"because the appellant failed to provide us with a transcript of the proceedings, we are
unable to review the evidence and, thus, are unable to ascertain whether the trial court's
findings were based upon sufficient evidence." Id. This Court ruled that "[a]bsent the
trial transcript, appellant's claim of error is 'merely an unsupported, unilateral allegation
which we cannot resolve.'" Id. (citation omitted).
In Gorostieta v. Parkinson. 2000 UT 99, % 16, 17 P.3d 1110, the Utah Supreme
Court held that "[a]s an appellate court, our 'power of review is strictly limited to the
record presented on appeal.'" The Supreme Court noted that where the record in that case
contained only partial transcripts, it was without an adequate record and therefore "must
assume the regularity of the proceedings below." Id.
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As in Horton. Henshaw has failed to provide this Court with a complete record that
includes a transcript of the trial. On January 18, 2007, Henshaw filed a Statement
Regarding Transcript wherein he stated that no transcript of any hearing was necessary
for this appeal. (R. at 1219-1220.) Consequently, the record in this case does not contain
a transcript of the trial or any previous hearing in this case. The Kings contend that the
record is inadequate in this case and that this Court "must assume the regularity of the
proceedings below." Gorostieta. 2000 UT 99, If 16.
As this Court stated in Horton. "[a]bsent the trial transcript, appellant's claim of
error is 'merely an unsupported, unilateral allegation which we cannot resolve.'" Horton.
794 P.2d at 849. In this case, absent a transcript of the trial, Henshaw's challenge to the
trial court's directed verdict is unsupported and incapable of being resolved on appeal for
lack of a sufficient record. The Kings contend that where Henshaw has failed to provide
this Court with a transcript of the jury trial, this Court must "assume the regularity of the
proceedings below, and presume that the trial court's directed verdict in favor of the
Kings was supported by sufficient evidence." See Gorostieta. 2000 UT 99, If 16.
Moreover, even if Henshaw had provided this Court with a trial transcript, he
would fail to meet his marshaling requirement where there would be no evidence in the
transcript which would refute or call into question the trial court's directed verdict.
Henshaw has asserted that he could not marshal any facts because the trial court's Order
on Motions for Directed Verdict did not contain express "findings of fact." (Br. at 11-
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12.) This assertion is mistaken on two grounds. First, the Kings contend that the trial
court's findings are themselves findings of fact. The fact there is no heading that reads
"findings of fact" does not mean the court's directed verdicts were not findings of fact.
Second, the court's Order clearly refers to the findings it made from the bench. (R. at
1068; Add. Exh. 2 at pg. 1.) As the Order states, the trial court made oral findings of fact
from the bench in accordance with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52. The fact that these
findings were made orally, only underscores the necessity of a transcript of the trial for
purposes of completing the record on appeal in accordance with Rule 11(e)(2).
As set forth above, the trial court entered directed verdict against Henshaw
because he failed to produce any facts which would preclude a judgment from being
entered against him. Accordingly, even if Henshaw did request and provide a transcript
of the trial, it would contain no facts in support of Henshaw's contention that the trial
court erred.
The trial court's directed verdict should be affirmed where Henshaw has failed to
provide a complete record on appeal from which this Court could ascertain whether the
directed verdict was correct. Furthermore, Henshaw has failed to marshal the evidence in
support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient when
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.6

6

Henshaw asserts that he was unable to marshal any facts where the trial court's
Order on Motions for Directed Verdict did not include specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law. (Br. at 11-12.) The Kings contend that the facts Henshaw is required
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III.

The Trial Court Did Not Commit An Abuse Of Discretion When It Denied
Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion And Therefore The Trial Court's Order
Should Be Affirmed
The trial court's denial of Henshaw's Rule 60(b) motion to vacate its Order

Granting Directed Verdict should be affirmed. This Court has held that a trial court's
denial of a motion to vacate a judgment is ordinarily reversed only upon an abuse of
discretion. Franklin Covev Client Sales. Inc. v. Melvin. 2000 UT App 110, Tf 8, 2 P.3d
451. In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Henshaw's Rule
60(b) motion where the court's entry of the Kings' proposed Order on Motions for
Directed Verdict did not violate Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or Henshaw's right to appeal the directed
verdict.
A.

The trial court did not violate Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure when it entered the Order and Judgment prior to receiving
Henshaw's objection

The trial court correctly held that it was not required to delay entry of the Judgment
and Order on Motions for Directed Verdict until after Henshaw submitted his Objection
to the proposed Order and Judgment with the court. In this case, the trial court granted

to marshal are not limited to those designated in a court's order or judgment as an express
finding of fact, but rather all facts presented at trial which the court may or may not have
relied upon when making its finding. The Kings also note that Henshaw's marshaling
burden is less exacting in this case where the trial court's finding was based on the
absence of evidence, and therefore there was no evidence for Henshaw to marshal.
Accordingly, Henshaw only needed to produce a single fact or piece of evidence to
question the trial court's findings of fact. He has failed to do this.
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the Kings' directed verdict and directed the Kings' counsel to prepare an order which
conformed to its ruling. (R. at 1068; Add. Exh. 2. at pg. 1; R. at 1128; Add. Exh. 4 at pg.
4.) The Kings' counsel then prepared and served the proposed Order and Judgment on
Henshaw's counsel and the court on May 4, 2006. (R. at 1128; Add. Exh. 4 at pg. 4.)
The trial court then entered the proposed Order and Judgment on May 15,2006. (R. at
1125-1130; Add. Exh. 4.) That same day, Henshaw sent an Objection to the proposed
Order and Judgment. (R. at 1128; Exh. 4. at pg.4.)
Henshaw has argued throughout this proceeding that the trial court erred in
entering the proposed Order and Judgment prior to receiving his Objection. (R. at 11541156.) Henshaw has argued, as he does now on appeal, that Rule 7(f)(2) mandated that
the "trial court was not legally entitled to execute 'the Order' until May 16, 2006 at the
earliest, and the Kings were not entitled to even submit "the Order" to the trial court for
signature until May 16, 2006 at the earliest." (Br. at 21.) Henshaw is mistaken.
Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures provides in relevant part:
[T]he prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve
upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision.
Objection to the proposed order shall be filed within five days of service. The
party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an
objection or upon expiration of the time to object.
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2). Pursuant to its language, this rule only applies to litigants and
imposes no requirements on a trial court regarding when it is allowed to enter a proposed
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order. The rule only governs what actions a prevailing party must take in serving a
proposed order on other parties and the court.
In Tolboe Constr. Co. v. Staker Paving & Constr. Co.. 682 P.2d 843 (Utah 1984),
the Utah Supreme Court analyzed Rule 2.9 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration,
the precursor to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In Tolboe. the court noted
that Rule 2.9 required that any documents be served on opposing counsel before they are
presented to the court for signature and that the rule's only other requirement is that
"notice of objection . . . be submitted to both the court and counsel within five days after
service." Id. at 848-849. The court then held that "[t]he fact that the court signed the
documents prior to plaintiffs submission of objections and prior to the expiration of the
five days from service of the documents, does not constitute a violation

The

requirement as well as the rule itself are binding upon counsel, not upon the trial court."
Id.
Likewise in this case, Rule 7(f)(2)'s requirements do not apply to the trial court
and the court was free to enter the Kings' proposed Order and Judgment whenever it
chose to, regardless of whether Henshaw's Objection had been received. While the Kings
concede they erred in submitting the proposed Order and Judgment to the court prior to
being served with Henshaw's Objection, the Kings contend that this mistake was
inadvertent and has no bearing on the trial court's right to enter a proposed order
whenever it chooses unfettered by the procedural requirements of Rule 7(f)(2).
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The trial court's Memorandum Decision and Order on Henshaw's Rule 60(b)
Motion ruled that pursuant to Tolboe. the provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) did not apply to the
court and it was therefore free to enter the proposed Order prior to receiving Henshaw's
Objection. (R. at 1210-1211; Add. Exh. 6 at pgs. 2-3.) The Kings contend that since
Utah law is clear that the provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) only apply to litigants and not the
court, that the trial court did not err in entering the proposed Order and Judgment prior to
receiving Henshaw's Objection.
B.

The trial court correctly denied Henshaw's Rule 60(b) motion even
though the Kings9 counsel failed to serve a copy of the signed judgment
on Henshaw pursuant to Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure

Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion also sought to set aside the trial court's directed
verdict on the grounds that the Kings' counsel violated Rule 58A(d) by not serving a copy
of the signed judgment on Henshaw. The trial court correctly rejected this argument
where Henshaw presented no evidence that he was diligent in attempting to ascertain
whether the judgment had been entered or that the Kings' counsel had actual knowledge
that the judgment had been entered and intentionally withheld that information from
Henshaw.
Rule 58A(d) provides, "[a] copy of the signed judgment shall be promptly served
by the party preparing i t . . ..The time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the
requirement of this provision." Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(d). Henshaw contends that because
the Kings' counsel did not serve a copy of the signed judgment on him that the trial court
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erred in entering the proposed Order. (Br. at 24.) While the Kings concede that did not
serve a copy of the entered judgment on Henshaw, it was not deliberate and that they only
failed to do so because they too were unaware that their proposed Order had been entered
by the court on May 15, 2006.7 However, as the trial court correctly pointed out, a litigant
is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) for lack of notice about a judgment if he fails to
demonstrate "diligence in trying to determine whether judgment had been entered."
Oseguera v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 2003 UT App 46, f 9, 68 P.3d 1008.
In this case, notwithstanding the Kings' failure to serve a copy of the signed
judgment on Henshaw, Henshaw is not entitled to relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) where he
provided no evidence to the trial court, or on appeal, that he was diligent in trying to
determine whether the proposed Order and Judgment had been entered against him.
Henshaw did not present any evidence of an attempt to determine if the Kings' proposed
Order had been entered even though he knew at the close of the jury trial in April that the
Kings' Motion for Directed Verdict had been granted. Moreover, Henshaw was served
with a proposed Order on Motions for Directed Verdict by the Kings' counsel on May 4,
2006. (R. at 1128; Add. Exh. 3 at pg. 4.) Even though Henshaw had actual knowledge
that the trial court had granted the Kings' directed verdict and that the Kings had prepared

7

Since the Kings did not know that their proposed Order and Judgment had been
entered when they were served with Henshaw's Objection, they filed a Reply
Memorandum in Support of their proposed Order and Judgment with the trial court on
May 22, 2006. (R. at 1091-1099.)
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a proposed Order granting the verdict, Henshaw provided no evidence of any actions he
took to determine if the proposed Order and Judgment had been entered.
Furthermore, Henshaw's contention that the Kings' counsel had actual knowledge
that the proposed Order and Judgment had been entered yet intentionally withheld this
information from Henshaw is unsupported by any evidence. As the trial court concluded,
Henshaw produced "no evidence to convince this Court that [the Kings' counsel] had
actual knowledge of the judgment and intentionally failed to notify the plaintiffs about it."
(R. at 1214; Add. Exh. 6 at pg. 5.)
In addition, the plain language of Rule 58A(d) provides that its requirements do
not have any bearing on "[t]he time for filing a notice of appeal...." Utah R. App. P.
58A(d). Therefore, even if the Kings' counsel did not comply with Rule58A(d)'s
requirement that he serve a copy of the signed Order and Judgment on Henshaw, that
inadvertent mistake has no bearing on the applicability of Rule 4(a)'s requirement that
Henshaw file a timely notice of appeal within thirty days of entry of the proposed Order
and Judgment. Accordingly, Henshaw's failure to file a timely notice of appeal is not
cured by the Kings' failure to comply with Rule 58A(d).
The trial court properly rejected Henshaw's contention that the Kings' failure to
serve a copy of the signed judgment on Henshaw mandated setting aside the Judgment
and Order on Motions for Directed Verdict. Henshaw was not entitled to relief under
Rule 60(b) where he provided no evidence that he had been diligent in attempting to
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determine whether the proposed Order had been entered or that the Kings' counsel had
actual knowledge that the Order had been entered yet withheld that information from
Henshaw. Therefore, the trial court's denial of Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion was not an
abuse of discretion.
C.

The trial court's denial of Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion did not deny
Henshaw his right to appeal in violation of his due process rights

Henshaw's contention that his right to appeal the directed verdict was denied
where the trial court denied his Rule 60(b) Motion is erroneous. (See Br. at 19.) The trial
court's denial of his Rule 60(b) Motion had no bearing on Henshaw's absolute right to
appeal. As set forth above, even assuming Henshaw did not receive actual notice that the
trial court entered the Kings' proposed Order and Judgment until June 19, 2006, Henshaw
still could have filed a motion for extension of time to appeal pursuant to Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(e) or a timely Rule 59(e) motion. However, Henshaw neglected to
elect either of these remedies, and his right to appeal was forfeited by virtue of his own
negligence and not the trial court's denial of his Rule 60(b) Motion.
Additionally, Henshaw has not been denied due process or equal protection at any
point of this case. Constitutional due process is summarized as follows, "[fjederal due
process restrictions assure, to the extent possible that the defendant will have the
opportunity to be heard." Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1267, 1271 (Utah 1987)(citation
omitted). Due process protections afforded by the Utah Constitution have been
characterized as follows "[a] common theme of this Court's due process cases is that due
33

process 'hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only
after trial." Gray v. Dep't of Employment Sec, 681 P.2d 807, 826 (Utah 1984)(Durham,
C , dissenting).
The Kings contend that throughout this proceeding Henshaw's arguments have
been heard by the trial court. The fact that the court did not agree with Henshaw is not
synonymous with the denial of due process. Moreover, Henshaw's contention that the
trial court denied him due process where it entered the proposed Order before receiving
his Objection is contradicted by the trial court's June 19, 2006 Memorandum Decision
wherein the court noted that it had considered and rejected Henshaw's Objection since the
proposed Order and Judgment conformed to the court's directed verdict. (R. at 1128;
Add.Exh.4atpg.4.)
In short, Henshaw's contention that he has been denied due process or equal
protection by the trial court is misplaced and should be rejected.
IV.

The Kings Are Entitled To Their Attorney Fees Pursuant To Utah Rule Of
Appellate Procedure 33
The Kings are entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure where Henshaw's appeal is frivolous. Rule 33 defines a
"frivolous" appeal as one that is "not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or
not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." Utah R.
App. P. 33(b). The Utah Supreme Court has noted that a party's case is not frivolous
where the "brief as a whole is supported by the record and the [party] makes good faith
34

arguments that are adequately supported by case law, as opposed to a case in which the
record [is] devoid of admissible evidence." Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, ^
19, 104 P.3d 1208.
In this case, Henshaw's appeal isfrivolousas defined by both Rule 33 and the
Utah Supreme Court. As set forth above, Henshaw's appeal is unsupported by the record
where Henshaw failed to provide this Court with a transcript of the April jury trial as part
of the record. Additionally, Henshaw's brief is replete with unsupported factual
allegations such as his contention that there was "substantial indirect and circumstantial
evidence that the kings knew that 'the Order' had both been signed and entered.'" (Br. at
19.) Yet, Henshaw cites to no such indirect or circumstantial evidence in the record, let
alone direct and concrete evidence. Accordingly, the record in this case is "devoid of
admissible evidence" upon which this Court could review the correctness of the trial
court's rulings and Henshaw's appeal is therefore frivolous.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Kings ask this Court to affirm the trial court's Order
on Motion for Directed Verdicts and its Order denying Henshaw's Rule 60(b) motion.
Additionally, the Kings contend that they should be awarded their attorney fees where
Henshaw's appeal is frivolous.
DATED this ^ / ^ day of May, 2007.
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C.

David R.
Anthony
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit 1:

April 20,2006 Jury Verdict (R. atlOl 1-1012.)

Exhibit 2:

May 15,2006 Order on Motions for Directed Verdict (R. at 1068-1072.)

Exhibit 3:

May 15,2006 Judgment (R. at 1073-1074.)

Exhibit 4:

June 19,2006 Memorandum Decision and Order (R. at 1125-1130.)

Exhibit 5:

September 13, 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Alter
or Amend Judgment (R. at 1171-1174.)

Exhibit 6:

November 14, 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Relief
Pursuant to Rule 60(b) URCP (R. at 1209-1214.)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 2-1^ day of May, 2007,1 mailed two true and correct
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES postage prepaid, by First-Class U.S.
Mail to the following:
Charles A. Schultz
222 West 700 South
Brigham City, Utah 84302
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Exhibit 1

RECEIVED
APR 2 0 2006
01
em Disragr COURT

as*.

IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WAYNE COUNTY
18 South Main, Box 189 Loa, UT 84747
Telephone: 435-836-1301 Fax: 435-836-2479

BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW,
and DANA HENSHAW,

VERDICT
Case No. 000600007

Plaintiffs.

Aligned Judge: Wallace A, Lee

vs.
JACK KING and BONNIE KING,
Defendants.
WITH RESPECT TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
1.

Has the Plaintiff, by a preponderance of the evidence established that he is entitled to use
water from Pine Creek?
Yes

2.

Q

*-

If you answered "Yes," then how much water is the Plaintiff entitled to use?
D

3 hours of water being the entire Pine Creek water every 18 days;
gallons per day.

•
3.

No

Has the plaintiff, by a preponderance of the evidence, established that he has an easement
to connect athree (3) inch waterline to the six (6) inch waterlme located on the
defendant's property?
Yes

D

No

*

VERDICT, Case number 000600007, Page -2>
4.

If you answered "No" to 1 and 3 above, (hen skip to the section dealing with Defendant's
claims.

5.

If you answered "Yes" to both I and 3 above, has (he Plaintiff established, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he was damaged when (he defendants prevented him
from taking water through the three (3) inch waterline?
Yes

6.

•

No

D

If you answered "Yes," to 5, how much money will fairly compensate Plaintiff for the
damages sustained?
$

WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFENDANTS' CLAIMS
7.

If you answered "No" to 1, above, then do you find that title to the Pine Creek water
should be quieted in the Defendants?
Yes

D

No

H[

Exhibit 2

^PY

RECEIVED
MAY 1 5 2jb06

Russell S. Walker, #3363
David R. Williams, #6686
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C.
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
P.O. Box 3358
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-3358
Telephone: (801) 364-1100
Attorneys for the Pfamtrffc- Q£ F tf Hpfr \X\&
IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WAYNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW
and DANA HENSHAW,
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED
VERDICT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JACK KING and BONNIE KING

Civil No. 000600007

Defendants.

Judge Wallace A. Lee

This matter came before the Court for a jury trial on April 17,18,19 and 20,2006.
Plaintiffs Dee Henshaw, Dana Henshaw and Barbara Henshaw were represented by Charles A.
Schultz. Defendants Jack and Bonnie King were represented by David R. Williams of Woodbury
& Kesler, P.C.
At the close of plaintiffs' evidence, defendants moved for a directed verdict dismissing
all of plaintiffs' claims and granting defendants' counterclaim to quiet title to Pine Creek water.
The court decided to grant the motion in part and deny the motion in part for the reasons stated
from the bench.
1

IT IS ORDERED
1.

Plaintiffs' claim for tortuous interference or interference with economic relations
is dismissed with prejudice based on the stipulation of the parties.

2.

Plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is dismissed with
prejudice based on the stipulation of the parties.

3.

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and resolving
all controverted facts in their favor, the evidence failed to show that the
defendants converted property of the plaintiffs and the court directs a verdict of no
cause of action on plaintiffs' claim for theft or conversion.

4.

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and resolving
all controverted facts in their favor, the evidence failed to show that plaintiffs
Barbara Henshaw and Dana Henshaw are entitled to recover on any claim against
the defendants and the court directs a verdict of no cause of action on all of
Barbara Henshaw's claims and a verdict of no cause of action on all Dana
Henshaw's claims

5.

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and resolving
all controverted facts in their favor, the evidence failed to show that plaintiffs
acquired any right, title and/or interest of Raymond Watrous to Pine Creek water
or any right, title and/or interest of Raymond Watrous to any easement on the land

2

of the defendants and the court directs a verdict adjudging that plaintiffs acquired
no right, title or interest of Raymond Watrous to Pine Creek water or to an
easement.
6.

The court grants plaintiffs' motion to amend claims to conform to the evidence
and, therefore, dismisses plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract and claim for
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing with prejudice. Plaintiff Dee
Henshaw may present to the jury a claim that he is entitled to use water from Pine
Creek, a claim that he has an easement to connect a three(3) inch waterline to the
six(6) inch waterline on the defendants' property and claim that he was damaged
when the defendants prevented him from taking water through the six (6) inch
waterline.

7.

Defendants' motion for a directed verdict on the claim that plaintiff is entitled to
use water from Pine Creek, the claim that plaintiff has an easement to connect a
three (3) inch waterline to the six(6) inch waterline on the defendants' property,
the claim that plaintiff was damaged when the defendants prevented him from
taking water through the six(6) inch waterline and on defendants' claim to quiet
title to Pine Creek water against the claims of plaintiffs and their successors in
interest is denied.

3

At the close of defendants' evidence, plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict on plaintiff
Dee Henshaw's claim that he is entitled to use water from Pine Creek, the claim that he has an
easement to connect a three (3) inch waterline to the six(6) inch waterline on the defendants'
property, and on defendants' claim to quiet title to Pine Creek water against the claims of
plaintiffs and their successors in interest. The court decided to deny the motion for the reasons
stated from the bench.
IT IS ORDERED
8.

Plaintiffs' motion for a directed verdict on plaintiff Dee Henshaw's claim that he
is entitled to use water from Pine Creek, the claim that he has an easement to
connect a three (3) inch waterline to the six (6) inch waterline on the defendants'
property, and on defendants' claim to quiet title to Pine Creek water against the
claims of plaintiffs and their successors in interest is dei

DATED this /£&day of May, 2006.
BYTH]

Judge Wallace
District Court Judg

4

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This certifies that I did deliver a true and correct copy of the forgoing ORDER ON
MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT to the following by first class U.S. mail, postage
prepaid on this '-f^* day of May, 2006:
Charles A. Schultz
222 West 700 South
BrighamCity, UT 84302
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RECEIVED
MAY 1 5 2006
Russell S. Walker, #3363
David R. Williams, #6686
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C.
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
P.O. Box 3358
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-3358
Telephone: (801) 364-1100

STHDl
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COURT

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WAYNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW
and DANA HENSHAW,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 000600007
JACK KING and BONNIE KING
Judge Wallace A. Lee
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for a jury trial on April 17, 18,19 and 20,2006.
Plaintiffs Dee Henshaw, Dana Henshaw and Barbara Henshaw were represented by Charles A.
Sciiultz. Defendants Jack and Bonnie King were represented by David R. Williams of Woodbury
& Kesler. Having heard the evidence and being fully advised, the jury entered a verdict and
based on that verdict, the Court orders, adjudges and decrees as follows:

1

WITH RESPECT TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
1.

Plaintiff Dee Henshaw is not entitled to use water from Pine Creek.

2.

Plaintiff Dee Henshaw does not have an easement to connect a three (3) inch

waterline to the six (6) inch waterline located on the defendants' property.
WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFENDANTS' CLAIMS
3.

Title to Pine Creek water should not be quieted in the defendants.

DATED this /$ffiday of May, 2006.
BY

Judge Wallace A
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MATTING
This certifies that I did deliver a true and correct copy of the forgoing JUDGMENT to
the following by first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid on this tf^ day of May, 2006:
Charles A. Schultz
222 West 700 South
Brigham City, UT 84302
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DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WAYNE COUNTY
Wayne County Courthouse
Loa, Utah 84747
Telephone: (435) 836-1301 Facsimile: (435) 836-2479
BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW,
and DANA HENSHAW,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Case No. 000600007
JACK KING and BONNIE KING,
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee
Defendants.

This case is before the Court for decision on the defendants' Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict. In addition, this Memorandum Decision will address the plaintiffs
Objection to the Proposed Judgment and Proposed Order on Motions for Directed Verdict.
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
This case was tried to a jury on 17-20 April, 2006. At the conclusion of the trial, the Jury
rendered a verdict which found the defendants had failed to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that title to Pine Creek water should be quieted in them. Thereafter, the defendants filed
a timely Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
Analysis of a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict requires the Court to
"look at the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, granting the j.n.o.v. motion only if this examination demonstrates that there is insufficient

HENSHAW v. KING, Case No. 000600007
Memorandum Decision and Order
Page 2

evidence to uphold the verdict." Franklin v. Stevenson, 987 P.2d 22, P6 (Utah 1999); see also
Eddy v. Albertson 's, Inc., 34 P.3d 781, 783 (Utah 2001); Collins v. Wilson, 984 P.2d 960, 964
(Utah 1999).
In this case, the evidence established that in consideration of payment in the amount of
$1,500.00, the defendants executed a water deed to Mr. and Mrs. Raymond Watrous with the
intent of conveying water to the Watrouses for use on property owned by the Watrouses. Later,
the Watrouses sold their property to the plaintiff. However, neither the Watrouses nor the
plaintiff ever perfected a water right based on the water deed by filing an application for a change
in the point of diversion with the Utah State Engineer.
In addition, extensive evidence established a clear course of conduct between the
defendants, the Watrouses, and the plaintiff, in which the defendants acquiesced in use of Pine
Creek water by the Watrouses and the plaintiff, on the plaintiffs property. Such use continued
each year for a period in excess of twenty (20) years, because the defendants, and everyone else
concerned, believed the defendants had sold the water by virtue of the water deed to Mr. and
Mrs. Watrous.
Finally, during the trial, Kirk Forbush, Regional Engineer, testified that because neither
the Watrouses nor the plaintiff perfected the water conveyed by the water deed, the plaintiff
acquired no right recognized or documented in records of the office of the State Engineer.

HENSHAW v. KING, Case No. 000600007
Memorandum Decision and Order
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However, Mr. Forbush also testified that failure to perfect the water acquired under the water
deed did not invalidate the water deed or the sale of the water to Mr. and Mrs. Watrous.
From all the evidence presented at the trial, viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, it was reasonable for the Jury to conclude that the plaintiff acquired no
recognizable right to use Pine Creek water because of failure to perfect the water acquired from
the defendants in the water deed.
However, it was also reasonable for the Jury to conclude that because the defendants
freely admit they sold Pine Creek water to the Watrouses, and because thereafter, they acquiesced
in use of Pine Creek water by the Watrouses and the plaintiff (as successor in interest to Mr. and
Mrs. Watrous) for a period in excess of twenty (20) years, the defendants should not now be able
to disavow that sale and to retake water they admittedly sold simply because the Watrouses failed
to take the steps necessary to perfect their right to divert and use the water. The fact that the
Jury's verdict leaves the issue somewhat unsettled does not undermine the credibility of the
verdict.
On this basis, viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Court finds
sufficient evidence to uphold the verdict of the Jury. The defendants' Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict is denied.

HENSHAW v. KING, Case No. 000600007
Memorandum Decision and Order
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PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT AND PROPOSED ORDER
Following the trial, the Court directed counsel for the defendants to draft a proposed
Judgment based on the Jury's verdict and a proposed Order, regarding the Court's ruling on the
parties' respective Motions for Directed Verdict. Counsel for the defendants complied with the
Court's directive, and circulated a proposed Judgment and Order to counsel for the plaintiff for
approval on or about 4 May 2006.
At the conclusion often (10) days from the date the drafts were submitted to counsel for
the plaintiff, the Clerk presented the proposed Judgment and Order to the Court for signature.
Having received no objection to the drafts, the Court executed the Judgment and Order on 15
May 2006.
On 18 May 2006, the Clerk of the Court received the plaintiffs Objection to the proposed
Judgment and Order. The Objection was signed by counsel for the plaintiffs on 15 May 2006.
On this basis, the Court finds the plaintiffs Objections are not timely. Nevertheless, the
Court also finds the Judgment and Order prepared by counsel for the defendant to accurately
reflect the Court's ruling on the Motions for Directed Verdict, as well as the Verdict rendered by
the Jury in this case.
Therefore, the plaintiffs objection to both documents is overruled.
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DATED this

15% day of

WALLACE A. L
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DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WAYNE COUNTY
Wayne County Courthouse, Loa, Utah 84747
Telephone: (435) 836-1301; Facsimile: (435) 836-2479

BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW,
and DANA HENSHAW,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON MOTION TO ALTER OR
AMEND JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JACK KING and BONNIE KING,
Case No. 000600007
Defendants.
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee

On 27 June 2006, the plaintiffs filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. The
Motion is accompanied by a Memorandum. Neither the plaintiffs' Motion nor their
Memorandum refers to any rule as the basis for the Motion. Therefore, the Court construes the
plaintiffs' Motion as a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 59(e).
Despite the title of their Motion, the plaintiffs' argument appears to center around the
Court's Order on Motions for Directed Verdict rather than the Judgment itself. However, the
Court's Order on Motions for Directed Verdict is a judgment of the Court under the definition of
"judgment" contained in Rule 54(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, because it is an order from
which an appeal lies.
Under Rule 59(e), "a motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than

,
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10 days after entry of the judgment." Both the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict and the
Judgment were entered in this case on 15 May 2006. The plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend
the Judgment is untimely under Rule 59(e) because it was served more than a month after the
entry of the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict and the Judgment.
In their memorandum in support of the motion, the plaintiffs explain that they failed to
file their motion on time because they did not receive a copy of the executed Order1. The Court
cannot independently determine whether this is correct because the file does not contain any
certificate of service indicating the plaintiffs were ever sent a copy of the executed Order. The
plaintiffs argue that it was the defendants' responsibility to serve a copy of the executed Order
on the plaintiffs.
Regardless, the language of Rule 59(e) is clear that a motion to alter or amend the
judgment must be filed within ten (10) days after entry of the judgment, as opposed to notice of
entry of the judgment. Therefore, the plaintiffs' Motion is untimely and should not be
considered by the Court. The Motion is denied.

By their own assertion, the plaintiffs learned about the execution of the Order from this Court's decision
on 19 June 2006.
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DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WAYNE COUNTY
Wayne County Courthouse, Loa, Utah 84747
Telephone: (435) 836-1301; Facsimile: (435) 836-2479

BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW,
and DANA HENSHAW,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON MOTION FOR RELIEF
PURSUANT TO RULE 60(b) URCP

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JACK KING and BONNIE KING,
Case No. 000600007
Defendants.
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee

INTRODUCTION
The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The defendants responded; and the plaintiffs replied. The motion is now submitted
for a decision.
The plaintiffs seek to vacate the directed verdict entered by the Court on 15 May 2006.
The plaintiffs raise the following grounds for requested relief: (1) the Court erred in entering the
directed verdict prematurely without considering the plaintiffs' objections in violation of Rule
7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) the defendants failed to notify the plaintiffs that
the directed verdict had been signed by the Court as required by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 58A(d).
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Under Rule 60(b)(6), the Court has authority and discretion to relieve a party from a final
judgment "for any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." The Court
considers whether the grounds advanced by the plaintiffs are sufficient to justify such relief.
ANALYSIS
1.

Alleged Violation of Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
This Court previously considered the plaintiffs' objections to the proposed Order

regarding the parties' Motions for Directed Verdict in its Memorandum Decision and Order
dated 19 June 2006. In that Decision and Order, this Court did find the plaintiffs' objections
were not timely, but, notwithstanding the untimeliness of the objections, the Court still
considered the objections and specifically found "the Judgment and Order prepared by counsel
for the defendant to accurately reflect the Court's ruling on the Motions for Directed Verdict, as
well as the Verdict rendered by the Jury in this case." On this basis, the plaintiffs' objections
were overruled.
Regardless, the Court finds that by its terms, Rule 7(f)(2) is binding only upon counsel
and not upon the trial court. See Tolboe Construction Co. v. Staker Paving & Construction Co.,
682 P.2d 843 (Utah 1984).
In Tolboe, the Supreme Court analyzed Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice of the United
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States District Court for the District of Utah1, which, at the time, provided that the notice of
objections to the proposed order "shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five days
after the service of proposed order on the opposing counsel."
The plaintiff in that case argued that Rule 2.9 was violated because the court had signed
the proposed order a day after it was served upon the opposing counsel. Id. at 848. Thus, the
plaintiff maintained it was denied an opportunity to object, and moved the court to vacate the
order. Id. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs argument was without merit because Rule
2.9 was binding only upon counsel and not upon the trial court. Id. at 849.
The requirement of Rule 7(f)(2)2 is similar to the requirement of Rule 2.9 described
above. Therefore, similar analysis applies.
The Court declines to vacate the Order regarding the Directed Verdict on this ground.
2.

Alleged Violation of Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
The plaintiffs' request to vacate the directed verdict on this ground should also be denied.

lr

Today the requirements of this rule are in Rule 54-1 (b) of the Rules of Practice of the United States
District Court for the District of Utah.
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless
otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon
the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be
filed within five days after service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served
with an objection or upon expiration of the time to object.
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The plaintiffs claim they did not receive proper notice of entry of the judgment from the
defendants as required by Rule 58A(d). Generally, to be entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) for
lack of notice about a judgment, a moving party must demonstrate "diligence in trying to
determine whether judgment had been entered" or that the moving party was "actually misled . . .
whether there had been entry of judgment." Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 68 P.3d
1008, 1010-11 (Utah App. 2003). See also Hawley v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2005 UT App
368.
In this case, the plaintiffs produced no evidence demonstrating any efforts to learn about
entry of the judgment. Therefore, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs were not diligent enough
in trying to determine whether the judgment had been entered.
Similarly, the only evidence the plaintiffs advance in an attempt to prove they were
misled to believe that the judgment had not been entered in this case is the plaintiffs' statement
that the defendants responded to their objections to the proposed order instead of notifying them
about entry of the order and judgment.
The case file shows that the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict and the Judgment
were signed and entered by the Court on 15 May 2006. The plaintiffs signed their Objections to
the proposed order and judgment on 15 May 2006, and they were received by the Court on 18
May 2006. The defendants' Reply to the plaintiffs' Objections was signed on 19 May 2006; and
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stamped by the clerk on 22 May 2006.
Based on these dates, the Court may only speculate whether the defendants' counsel knew
about entry of the judgment on 19 May 2006 when he signed and mailed the Reply. The plaintiffs
have produced no evidence to convince this Court that Counsel for the defendants had actual
knowledge of the judgment and intentionally failed to notify the plaintiffs about it.
Thus, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have failed to produce facts sufficient to
demonstrate that they were diligent in trying to learn about entry of the judgment or that they
were actually misled to believe that no judgment had been entered.
Therefore, the plaintiffs' request for Rule 60(b) relief on this ground is also denied.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The plaintiffs' Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 60(b) URCP is denied.
DATED this l^tj

day of
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